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Fr9m· the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
PUNCTURING THE EQUITY
CUSHION-ADEQUATE
PROTECTION FOR SECURED
CREDITORS IN
REORGANIZATION CASES

An important protection provided by the Bankruptcy Code is
the automatic stay against lien
enforcement which prevents the
dissipation of the debtor's assets
upon the filing of a petition. Section 362(d)(1) limits such protection by permitting parties to
seek relief from the stay "for
cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property." 1 In view of the confusion and uncertainty as to the
meaning and requirements of the
"adequate protection" concept, it
is not surprising that lawyers and
judges will tend to search for a
concrete mathematical formula on
which to rely for the application of
this standard.
Until the recent case of In re
• Counsel to the law firm of Levin
& Weintraub, New York City; mem-

ber of the National Bankruptcy Conference .
...,.. Associate Dean and Professor of
Law, Hofstra University School of Law,
Hempstead, New York.
They are also co-authors of Bankruptcy Law Manual, published by Warren, Gorham & Lamont.
111 U.S.C. § 362(d)(l). See Weintraub & Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual n 1.09, 8.10 (1980).

Alyucan Interstate Corp. 2 the lodestar of the mathematical formula
used by courts 'in determining
what constitutes adequate protection for secured creditors was the
so-called equity cushion. In fact,
the Alyucan court interrupted
abruptly a trend which may have
resulted in adequate protection
being almost synonymous with
the presence of a meaningful
equity cushion. The court in that
case endeavored to puncture the
equity cushion as a test for adequate protection in reorganization
cases by analyzing several of the
decisions built on this theory.

In re Pitts: Birth of the
Equity Cushion

Singled out as the forerunner of
the many cases which started along
the ~·equity cushion" route was In
re Pitts, 8 a Chapter 13 case where
residential real property was valued at $125,000 with first and
second mortgages as well as the
costs and expenses of foreclosure
aggregating $105,875. In its ad2 7 B.C.D. 1123 (D. Utah 1981).
a 2 B.R. 476 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The
Alyucan court also cited other cases
which have relied on an equity cushion
analysis. See, e.g., In re Rogers Dev.
Corp., 2 B.R. 679 (B.D. Va. 1980); In
re Lake Tahoe Land Co., Inc., S B.R.
34 (D. Nev. 1980); In re Tucker, S
B.R. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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versary complaint to modify the
automatic stay and seeking foreclosure, the plaintiff (holder of the
second mortgage) contended that
there was a lack of adequate protection in the differential between
these two amounts and, therefore,
the plaintiff was not adequately
protected. The debtor argued to
the contrary "that the cushion between the encumbrances and costs
of sale, $105,875, and $125,000,
requires a finding that the plaintiff is adequately protected." 4
As we all do, the courts first
looked to the Bl:!nkruptcy Code to
ascertain the meaning of adequate
protection and, upon such inquiry,
the court found only three specific examples of adequate protection in Section 361, namely, periodic payments, a substituted lien
and the "indubitable equivalent." 5
The search was not very helpful
for solving the instant problem
and the court found it necessary
to consult the legislative history
which revealed that the examples
in Section 361 were ".neither exclusive nor exhaustive. They all
rely, however, on the value of the
protected entity's interest in the
property involved." 6
Relying on the portion of the
House Report which deals with
Section 361, the court noted that
"[t]heye may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured
creditor an absolute right to his
bargain may be impossible or seri4 In re
5 11
6 H.

ously detrimental to the bankruptcy laws." 7 However, "[t]hough
the creditor might not receive his
bargain in kind, the purpose of the
section is to ensure that the secured creditor receives in value
essentially what he [bargains]
for." 8
The court in Pitts then analyzed
the problem of adequate protection in terms of the presence of an
equity cushion:
The base figure in any realistic
analysis of the secured creditor's
position must be the aggregate of
(i) the amount of principal,
interest, and other permissible
charges to date of sale, plus (ii)
the costs of foreclosure and sale.
The difference between this base
figure and the anticipated sales
price may be referred to as the
cushion. In the case at bar, the
cushion consists of the difference
between $125,000 (the value of
the property) and $105,875 (the
aggregate of $62,260, the first
lien; $34,615, the second lien; and
$9,000, the cost of foreclosure
and sale) . This cushion is equal
to $19,125.11

The court then proceeded to
mention many variables which
could destroy or increase the
cushion: '"termite costs, structural
defects, title problems unforeseen,
attorneys' fees, upswing or depression of land values, fluctuation of
interest rates affecting the availability to purchasers of mortgage
funds and matters of similar import." 10 Also mentioned was the

Pitts, note 3 supra, at 477.

u.s.c.

Id.
Bid.
1l In re Pitts, note 3 supra, at 478.
10 Id.

7

361.
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 339 (1977).
§
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fact that the plaintiff, a second
mortgagee, was currently sustaining the burden of making payments to the first mortgagee in
order to keep it from foreclosing.
Moreover, interest of approximately $1,000 per month was
accruing on the debts secured by
the encumbrances which also could
reduce the cushion during the life
of the automatic stay.
Although the court recognized
that the cushion was fragile and
precarious, its existence at that
time could not be denied. The
mere presence of a minimal cushion, in and of itself, was enough to
justify continuation of the stay .u
However, the court also noted
that adequate protection required
"at a minimum, a periodic and
careful surveillance of the facts
and circumstances and the structuring of relief calculated to avoid
dissipation of whatever protection
the cusWon affords." 12 Accordingly, the court adjourned the
hearing for approximately fortyfive days at which time it would
consider further evidence concern-

ing valuation and a reanalysis of
the cushion.1a
The Alyucan Court's Analysis

.Despite its "practical appeal
and ease of application," 14 the
equity cushion analysis as a means
of determining adequate protection was expressly rejected by the
Alyucan court. The debtor in that
case was a real estate construction
company with realty valued at
$1.425 million on the date that a
Chapter 11 petition was filed
. value did not erode as of'
which
the hearing date. The court fixed
the amount of the secured debt at
$1,297,226 as of the petition date,
but with interest accruing at approximately $8,000 per month, the
debt balance increased to $1,330,
761 as of the time of the hearing.
13 In adjourning the matter for a period of more than thirty days, the court
may have violated suggested Interim
B.ankr~ptcy Rule 4001 (a) which proVI~es, m essence, that the stay expires
thirty days after a final bearing is commenced pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362
(e) (2) unless within that time the court
determines that the stay be continued.

To the extent that Rule 4001 purports to preclude this court from
proceeding with the conduct of this
hearing in the manner indicated it
is invalid. The imposition of a thhtyday maximum within which the court
must finally determine the rights of
the parties and the conditions upon
which the stay is regulated unduly
restricts the discretion of the court
and its power to deal with substantive
rights of the parties under the Code.

11

Id. at 478-479. The Alyucan court
while giving historical accommodation
to the Pitts court for being the first to
articulate the cushion concept nevertheless indicated a flaw in the decision:
"[t]he fact that plaintiff was a junior
lienholder and therefore would be
:squeezed' as the senior lien accrued
mt~r~st was not stressed, nor have later
o~m10~s ~iscussed the significance of
th~s pomt m terms of the cushion analystS or adequate protection." In re
Alyucan, note 2 supra, at 1127, n. 14.
12 111 re Pitts, note 3 supra at 478479.
'

Id. at 479.
14Jn re Alyucan, note 2 supra, at
1127.
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rpus, the equity cushion on the
date of the petition was $127,774,
or approximately 9 percent of the
value of the collateral, but decreased to $94,239, or 6.5 percent,
as of the hearing date. Furthermore, a continuation of interest
accumulation without further payments would result in the dissipation of the entire' cushion within a
year.
The court began its discussion
by commenting that the absence
of a definition of "adequate protection" in the Code "was probably deliberate." 15 Congress was
"aware of the turbulent rivalry of
interests in reorganization. . . .
This problem required, not a formula, but a calculus, opentextured, pliant, and versatile,
atlaptable to 'new ideas' which are
'continually being implemented in
this field' and to 'varying circumstances and changing modes of
financing.' " 16 In a footnote, the
court added that "[n]ot only is the
concept kaleidoscopic, but also the
circumstances to which it applies
will change from creditor to creditor, and from hearing to hearing,
or even as to the same creditor in
different hearings." 17
The court premised its approach
to adequate protection by observing that "[r]elief from the stay cannot be viewed in isolation from
the reorganization process." 18 The
15/d. at 1124.
16 Id. The court was quoting, in part,
from H. Rep. No. 595, note 6 supra.
17 In re Alyucan, note 2 supra, at
1124, n.3.
18/d. at 1124.

reorganization process, which is
procedural in nature, is designed
to prevent a seizure of the debtor's
assets by creditors, thereby avoiding preferential treatment of levying creditors while encouraging rehabilitation. This does not mean
that creditors are remediless during the interim protection afforded
by the automatic stay, but may
seek relief pursuant to Section 362
(d) "fashioned to suit the exigencies of the case." 19
Four Factors Affecting
Adequate Protection
In breaking down the factors
which affect an "adequate protection" determination under Section
362(d), the court focused on four
fundamental questions which must
be asked in each case:
( 1) What is the interest in
property being protected? "This
classification is important because
adequate protection depends upon
the interest and property involved." 20 The interest of a lessor
may be treated differently than
that of a secured creditor. A
senior lienor's interest may be
treated differently than that of a
junior lienor. A secured party
who has repossessed is not necessarily treated the same as one who
is not in possession.
(2) What aspects of the interest in property require protection?
Emphasizing that adequate protection is concerned with the value of
the interest in property, the court
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19/d.
20

Id. at 1125.
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noted that the interest in property
entitled to protection is not measured by the amount of the debt
but by the value of the lien. "A
mushrooming debt, through accrual of interest or otherwise, may
be immaterial, if the amount of
the lien is not thereby increased,
while vicissitudes in the market,
loss of insurance, or other factors
affecting the value of the lien are
relevant to adequate protection." 21
(3) From what is the interest
in property being protected? "The
short answer is from any impairment in value attributable to the
stay." 22 However, it is important
to realize that not all harm or
decline in value of the collateral
is caused by the stay. Impairment
of collateral which would have
resulted' even in the absence of the
stay, such as when creditors acquiesce in some harm to the collateral
for business or other reasons, may
not be attributable to the stay.
( 4) What is the method of protection? Section 361 sets forth
three illustrative methods for providing adequate protection. The
A lyucan court was critical of those
courts which have not looked beyond such alternatives or which
have insisted on a showing of indubitable equivalence. "These approaches miss the mark. . . . Indeed, something 'indubitable' is
more than 'adequate'; 'equivalent'
is more than 'protection'; hence,
the illustration may eclipse the
concept." 23
The court also
21Jd. at 1125-1126.
22Jd. at 1126.
28Jd.

pointed out that in some cases
no steps are required to afford
adequate protection either because
the value of the interest in property is not declining or because
the decline is not attributable to
the automatic stay.
Applying this analysis to the
instant case, the court concluded
that the plaintiff, a secured creditor with a first lien on the debtor's
realty, has ample collateral to protect it and that neither the collateral nor the lien are declining
or are subject to sudden depreciation in value. Accordingly, relief
from the stay at that juncture was
unnecessary. Moreover, the court
noted that the property is essential to reorganization, and that
foreclosure and liquidation of the
realty would run counter to this
need and would deprive the debtor
and other creditors of going concern value. Indeed, if liquidation
takes place it should be under the
aegis of the bankruptcy court
which appears to be -a more satisfactory forum. Furthermore, the
secured creditor has other remedies; a trustee has been appointed
and it can work with him or the
creditors' committee to negotiate a
sale, seek a conversion to Chapter
7, or propose a plan. "In short,
the application of adequate pro-tection to the facts of this case
avoids the trauma of relief from
the stay and maintains the equilibrium of interests in this reorganization." 24
Turning now to the concept of
"equity cushion," which the court
24Jd. at 1127.
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defined as "the difference between
outstanding debt and the value of
the property against which the
creditor desires to act," 25 the court
observed that there is a trend
toward defining "ad~quate protection" in terms of such a cushion.
"As interest accrues, or depreciation advances, and the margin
declines, the cushion weakens and
the stay may be lifted." 26 Moreover, the emerging view is that the
stay should be lifted when the
cushion may be absorbed through
interest, commissions, and other
costs of resale. The judge also
indicated that courts have disagreed on what is the minimum
acceptable margin.27
Four Reasons to Reject
the Equity Cushion
The Alyucan court set forth
four reasons for rejecting the
equity cushion analysis, concluding that the presence of a cushion
is not essential for providing adequate protection. First, the focus
on the debt-to-collateral ratio obscures the purpose of adequate
protection which is to protect
251d.
261d.
27 See In re Tucker, S B.R. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (7.4 percent ~ushion
believed to be inadequate) ; In re Castle
Ranch of Ramona, Inc., 3 B.R. 45
(S.D. Cal. 1980) (8.6 percent cushion
held inaliequate); In re Rogers Dev.
Corp., 2 B.R. 679 (B.D. Va. 1980) (17
percent cushion is adequate); In re San
Clemente Estates, S B.R 605 (S.D.
Cal. 1980) (noting that 17 percent
cushion would be "precariously close
to being inadequate" under the particular circumstances of that case).

against ,impairment of the lien.
For exanwle, if the secured creditor had been undersecured on the
date of the petition, the lack of a
cushion would have required relief from the stay despite the usual
appreciation in the value of realty
and the fact that the stay did not
impair the lien. "This blurring of
objectives may produce improper
results." 28
Second, the equity cushion
analysis is inconsistent with the
illustrations of adequate protection found in Section 361 which
are primarily compensatory. These
illustrations do not speak in terms
of preserving equity, but deal only
with compensation for the decrease in the value of the lien. The
illustrations in Section 361, which
provide for periodic payments and
replacement liens, "contemplate
that value from other assets held
by debtors may be appropriated to
supply any needed protection." 29
In contrast, focusing merely on the
ratio of the debt to the value of
the collateral ignores other sources
of protection, including capitalization of earnings which could show
significant income potential.
Third, an equity cu~hion analysis is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of Section 362(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code. Section
362(d)(2) expresses a "legislative judgment" that a lack of
equity, absent a further showing
that the collateral is unnecessary
to an effective reorganization, does
2BJn re Alyucan, 7 B.C.D. 1123,
1127 (D. Utah 1981).
29Jd. at 1128.
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not warrant relief from the stay.
In fact, the dual requirement (lack
of equity and unnecessary for reorganization) "emphasizes the role
of equity, when present, not as
a cushion, but to underwrite,
through sale or credit, the rehabilitation of debtors." so
Fourth, the cushion analysis
"has no basis in the historical
development of relief from stay
proceedings." 31 The court relied
upon the leading literature dealing
with the rehabilitation chapters of
the former Bankruptcy Act to buttress its position that the role of
an equity cushion analysis was
extremely limited prior' to the
enactment of the Code. Warning
that a measure of the debtor's
equity in collateral may be a red
herring in the determination of
whether relief from a stay should
be granted, one commentator
added:
It is submitted that the real determinants should be and probably
are the factors just suggested. For
example, if a debtor badly needs
the property and its vital signs
are strong, the size of its equity
shouldn't have much bearing on
the situation, although a large
equity does make a decision favorable to the debtor more palatable
for all concerned. s2

Another commentator relied
upon by the court is Professor
80Jd.
81
82

Id.

at 1121.

Festersen, "Equitable Powers in
Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Protection
of the Debtor and the Doomsday Principle," 46 Am. Bankr. L.J. 311, 333
(1972).

Kennedy, who was quoted as writing:
The existence of an equity is not
. . . and should not be, indispensable to the continuation of a stay.
Congress explicitly authorized the
bankruptcy court to enjoin lien
enforcement when appropriate in
the pursuit of the objective of rehabilitation under Chapter XI. If
the secured creditor is adequately
protected from injury resulting
from the stay, the collateral is
essential to the reorganization,
and a reorganization in the interest of unsecured creditors is a
realistic possibility, the absence of
an equity should be immaterial.SS

Conclusion
The Alyucan case is enlightening as an in-depth examination of
the equity cushion approach to
solving adequate protection problems. It recognizes that the presence or absence of a cushion is
only one factor among many, and
it emphasizes the importance of
the relationship between the collateral and the reorganization
process. Jt is significant that the
court dismissed the complaint
seeking relief from the stay despite
the fact that the equity cushion at
the time of the hearing was only
6.5 percent, a figure which probably would have resulted in termination of the stay under the weight
of applicable case law despite the
finding that it would be a year
before the cushion would be dississ Kennedy, ''The Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy," 11 U. Mich. J. L. Ref.
175, 247 (1978).
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pated.84 The most important lesson, however, is that there is no
simple mechanism which could be
used by the courts on these issues.

"The facts of each case, thoughtfully weighted, not formularized,
define adequate protection." 85
85[n re

34

See note 27 supra.

Alyucan, note 28 supra, at

1129.

TAKE CARE OF YOUR BODY
"Washington-Inflation has increased the value of the
human body 643 percent in the past decade.
The Health Insur~nce Institute reports that the minerals in
the human body are now worth $7.28, compared to 98 cents
10 years ago.
In calculating worth, Dr. Harry Mosen, professor of anatomy
at the University of Illinois College of Medicine, added up the
costs of body minerals. He said at least one expert has placed a
$6 million value on a living adult by pricing body components
like hemoglobin, insulin and genetic material."

-American Business
June 1980
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